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Abstract 
 
Exploitation and oppression remain key concepts 
in Erik Olin Wright's social theory, and this piece provides 
a general mapping of those concepts. These concepts 
are defined and their connection is cleared out. Marx's 
theory of industrial reserve army is discussed to make 
the point that non-exploited workers are potentially useful 
for understanding how apparently superfluous people for 
exploiters have an impact on exploitation dynamics. 
Marx's point contributes to Wright's overall conceptual 
enterprise. 
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In this piece I investigate the relationship between exploitation and 
oppression in Erik Olin Wright’s work. Both concepts remain foundational to 
Wright’s sociological enterprises. Such enterprises include a two-decade-long 
project to make sense of classes in contemporary societies and a decade-long 
project on envisioning alternatives to the prevailing system of social 
relationships. To investigate the relationship between exploitation and 
oppression touches upon the core of Wright’s work.  
The parts of this investigative piece are twofold. First, I summarize 
Wright's framework of oppression and exploitation. I show the relation between 
the concepts and discuss tensions in Wright's framework. Second, I discuss his 
claim that exploitation remains one specific type of economic oppression; he 
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defines exploitation as ‘exploitative economic oppression.’2 Relying on Marx’s 
Capital, I discuss the role of people who are not economically exploited in 
guaranteeing the social reproduction of exploitative relations. The summary of 
Wright' framework and the discussion on exploitation and economic oppression 
aim to clarify some of his contributions. 
 
1. Exploitative-Economic-Oppression Communal Identity 
Figure 1—Wright’s Conceptual Frame of Oppression and Exploitation 
summarizes Wright's conceptual framework on the relationship between 
oppression and exploitation. The characteristics of that framework are threefold. 
Firstly, the argument is abstract rather than concrete. In that sense, abstract 
concepts are synthetic representations of phenomena, and concrete concepts 
remain a particular and historicized representation of phenomena, so that 
specific intervening determinations qualify – or even reverse – underlying 
expected tendencies of phenomena. For instance, one would have to distill 
elements of the American and the Swedish Capitalism – two distinct concrete 
phenomena – to get an abstraction called Capitalism. Such distinction relates to 
Marx's differentiation between levels of abstraction; to prove that claim would 
deflect me too much from the paper's goal. Secondly, the framework is relatively 
formal rather than substantial. I think of it as a computer file frame. When one 
clicks on a main file in a computer, a window with other files pop up. What 
differentiates the main file from the others is only the level of specificity. For 
instance, to get to exploitative economic oppression in Wright's frame, one must 
open the file Communal Identity Formation, then the file Oppression and finally 
Economic. I have not included most ramifications of Wright's frame in Figure 1; I 
have emphasized the conceptual path to exploitation. Thirdly, the building of the 
framework is logically sound rather than empirically driven. Even though Wright 
has engaged into quantitative and qualitative-method sociological enterprises, 
he situates his conceptual framework as solving theoretical puzzles in the 
Marxist tradition. To solve these puzzles, such as the class location of the 
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middle class,3 he engages in discussions about incongruencies of competing 
explanations, and he emphasizes the reasoning behind his claims. The strong 




Figure 1—Wright’s Conceptual Frame of Oppression and Exploitation 
 
Communal identity formation is the more general concept in the 
Wrightian framework and refers to regular social interactions that build social 
categories and shared views on society. Such regular interactions drive 
people's attitudes and the pattern of interactions with other individuals. To 
define this concept Wright relies on Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel's work 
(1981). The overall idea of communal identity formation is not to look at general 
mechanisms that lead to the formation of social categories, but to assess in 
relational terms how individuals interact with each other and based on those 
interactions might have in abstract diverse interests. In Wright's work, the 
concept serves two analytical purposes. First, it sets up the unit of analysis. 
Individuals embedded in relations remain the basic actor. An example of 
communal identity formation is class formation: “[class formation] refers to the 
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formation of collectively organized social forces within class structures in pursuit 
of class interests. [...] Any form of collectively constituted social relations which 
facilitate solidaristic action in pursuit of class interests is an instance of class 
formation” (Wright, 1997 pp. 191-2). Second, communal identity formation has 
no substance as a concept, just referring to a broad formal description of social 
life, and thus becomes an analytical tool to treat equally different forms of social 
classification and to look for overlapping and interactions among them. 
Communal identity formation does not say anything about how and why people 
form communities. 
Wright distinguishes two specific forms of communal identity formation: 
cooperative and oppressive. Cooperative communal identity, according to him, 
relies on trust, cooperation and sociability, and interactions remain with different 
degrees empowering and reciprocal (Wright, 2010). Domination and exclusion 
base oppressive communal identities. It is worth noticing that Wright refers in 
some occasion to exploitation as a form of cooperation, in the sense that 
exploiters depend on the “cooperation” of the exploited; here, he is invoking 
systematically coordinated interconnected practices, not some ideal of natural 
goodness or symmetrical reciprocity. Both forms of communal identity -- 
cooperative and oppressive -- are self-reproducible in abstract, as long as social 
organizations and institutions upon which they rest do not collapse due to inner 
flaws. Thus, the political agenda that motivates struggles against oppression is 
not restoring a “natural order” of kindness but removing a human harm. The 
argument for creating conditions for human flourishing is not that it is “natural” 
for human beings to flourish, just that it is possible and desirable. 
In Wright’s framework, specificity refers to providing a theoretical 
understanding of a particular form of social interaction so that we know when 
specific empirical cases should be treated as similar or different, as falling under 
the same broad category or not. Three aspects of that definition are important to 
understand the Wrightian Social Theory. First, the difference of levels of 
specificity is a theoretical construction, contributing to concept-building. Second, 
one of the aims is to clarify similarities and differences between cases. In that 
sense, cooperation and oppression are similar (because they are both 
communal structures or relations) and different (because they do not rest upon 
the same kinds of interactions). This second aspect indicates that Wright aims 
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to make typologies. Third, the definition of specificity theory outlines a research 
agenda for investigating particular forms of interaction: 1) to locate within which 
broad categories a particular form of interaction is; 2) to find out what makes a 
particular form of interaction different from others in the same broad category of 
interactions; and 3) to organize empirical cases based on the conceptual 
framework. 
Many dimensions of oppressive communal identities exist, according to 
Wright. In Figure 1, I mention “Race,” “Gender,” “Economic,” “Race*Gender,” 
and “…,” and I now discuss each one of them. The same labels could exist as 
dimensions of cooperation communal identities. In a genuinely non-racist 
society, however, racial dimensions would almost certainly disappear; people 
might still note and observe phenotypic differences of people connected to 
kinship and ancestry, but these would not be consolidated into distinct bounded 
“racial” categories. The five dimensions aforementioned are similar to the extent 
that they share being specific categories of the same broader category; in that 
case, they are all oppressive forms of communal identity. Dimensions qualify 
and specify the broader category, so that gender and race are not nouns in the 
formal framework, rather adjectives. According to Wright, the specificities of 
race – which differentiate it from other social classifications – are at least 
twofold: hereditary biological base and visible physical attribute. Thus, racial 
oppression relates to harmful social classifications based on some biological 
elements. Some other specificities would come into play to define what gender 
oppression is. Race and gender oppression, however, might come to interact, 
that is, they are not simply additive, but have interactive consequences. Such 
interaction does not challenge the existence of race and gender as independent 
specific dimensions, rather generate a new specific form of oppression, a by-
product of the interconnection of race and gender oppression: “race*gender 
oppressive communal identity.” The interconnection between race and gender 
oppressions is harder to imagine than between race and economic oppression 
or between gender and economic oppression. Wright investigates the latter in-
depth (1997 pp. 113-82). Considering that the possibilities of social 
classifications are endless and that the possibilities of interactive terms between 
those social classifications are also endless, the specific dimensions of 
oppressive communal identities are infinite. Is that a weakness of the model? 




The point here is to specify the actual mechanisms at work in the world. The 
only sense in which one may specify too many forms of oppression is that one 
incorrectly identifies something as a distinct form of mechanism when it is not. 
One might over-complexify a schema in the sense that one loses site of the 
really important and powerful forms of oppression that fragment solidarities and 
impose harms. Furthermore, the over-encompassing framework might be a 
form not to give priority of dimensions of oppression over others, and remains in 
tune with current studies on intersectionality. 
Wright sets three conditions that define economic oppression: “(a) The 
material welfare of one group of people is causally related to the material 
deprivations of another. (b) The causal relation in (a) involves coercively 
enforced exclusion from access to productive resources. (c) This exclusion in 
(b) is morally indictable” (Wright, 1994 p. 39).4 In that sense, economic 
oppression remains a relational concept: people are economically oppressed 
through their social relations to others; material accumulation occurs at the 
expense of people’s deprivation. Economic oppressors sustain that tense 
relation through what Wright calls “coercively enforced exclusion:” a set of 
mechanisms that legitimizes the unequal access to material resources and 
represses attempts of the oppressed to challenge their deprivation. The basic 
components of economic oppression, that differentiates that specific form of 
oppression form others, are conditions (a) and (b): the relation between material 
welfare of some groups to the deprivation of others, and the production and 
reproduction of that unequal relation through the coercively enforced exclusion 
from resources of various sorts. 
In a more specific level, Wright distinguishes between non-exploitative 
and exploitative economic oppression – he calls the latter exploitation. 
According to him, “The crucial difference between exploitation and non-
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exploitative oppression is that in an exploitative relation, the exploiter needs the 
exploited since the exploiter depends upon the effort of the exploited” (Wright, 
1994 p. 40). Wright defines three conditions for exploitative economic 
oppression: the inverse interdependent principle, the exclusion principle and the 
appropriation principle. The first two principles are the conditions (a) and (b) in 
the economic-oppression definition. The third principle is “[…] the causal 
mechanism which translates exclusion into differential welfare [involving] the 
appropriation of the fruits of labor of the exploited by those who control the 
relevant productive resources,” so that “The welfare of the exploiter depends 
upon the effort of the exploited, not merely the deprivations of the exploited” 
(Wright, 1997 p. 10). This dependency shapes the interactions of exploiters and 
exploited, since the former might downplay their domination to stimulate the 
latter to work harder. Thus, all concrete forms of exploitation are always 
economic oppressions, whereas not all forms of economic oppressions are 
exploitative. According to Wright, exploiters do not depend on the effort of 
economically non-exploited oppressed to generate surplus product, so those 
become superfluous. As I show below, this last claim is at most only partially 
correct. 
 
2. The Necessity of the Superfluous 
Wright makes the case that the effort of economically non-exploited 
oppressed is not necessary for the realization of surplus. According to Wright, 
an example of that situation is the relationship between the European settlers 
and Native American populations in North America: the settlers acquired 
material benefits at the expense of the Native American populations, in general 
by imposing a violent control over territories and by excluding the Native 
American populations from access to resources. The settlers did not need the 
Native American populations in order to increase the level of their welfare. From 
Wright’s perspective, “In the case of non-exploitative oppression, the 
oppressors would be happy if the oppressed simply disappeared. Life would 
have been much easier for the European settlers in North America if the 
continent had been uninhabited by people. Genocide is thus always a potential 




strategy for non-exploitative oppressors” (Wright, 1994 p. 40). In an exploitative 
relation, the oppressors’ welfare depends directly on the effort of the oppressed 
population. Genocide of the exploited is not a plausible option for the exploiters. 
The relationship between a company owner and the company workers remains 
an illustration of that situation: the owner’s welfare depends on the deprivation 
and the exclusion of the workers from material resources, and simultaneously 
depends on the workers’ production to accumulate capital. According to Wright, 
“This dependency of the exploiter on the exploited gives the exploited a certain 
form of power, since human beings always retain at least some minimal control 
over their own expenditure of effort. […] there is generally systematic pressure 
on exploiters to moderate their domination in one way or another to try to elicit 
some degree of consent from the exploited, at least in the sense of gaining 
some level of minimal cooperation from them” (Wright, 1997 p. 11).  
One’s position in a relation of exploitation -- whether one if the exploiter 
or the exploited -- shapes in the abstract one’s material interests. Owners of the 
means of production have a rational incentive to maximize, or optimize when 
conditions for maximization are not reproducible, their profits. Workers, who sell 
their labor power, have an incentive to maximize, or optimize when conditions 
for maximization are not reproducible, their emancipation from the labor market, 
that is, socially necessary conditions of having a flourishing life with 
independence from the market. Material interests influence one’s decisions: 
capitalists have a rational incentive to intensify workers’ effort in production, 
since profits depend from it, whereas workers have a rational incentive to resist 
the appropriation of the product of their labor. Wright aims to depart from Marx, 
whose theory of exploitation based on the labor theory of value he rejects 
(Wright, 1994), yet the Marxian approach to non-exploited population 
contributes to understanding how exploitation and non-exploitative economic 
oppression go together. 
According to Marx, capitalism -- an economic structure rooted on 
exploitation -- depends on the production and reproduction of non-exploited 
workers, that is, people who could be exploited but are not. As he says, “it is 
capitalist accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces indeed in 
direct relation with its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant working 
population, i.e. a population which is superfluous to capital's average 
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requirements for its own valorization, and is therefore a surplus population” 
(Marx, 1990 p. 782). Pauperism grows “in direct relation with” the advance of 
capitalism. The amount of the surplus population depends on the dynamics of 
capital, according to Marx;5 in special, investments in constant capital come 
generally with the exclusion of laborers from the production system. Marx's 
interpretation of the surplus population – which focuses on the inner logic of the 
capitalist mode of production – rejects the Malthusian approach, according to 
whom: “When wages are high, workers over-reproduce themselves. The 
consequent population increase produces a supply of labor larger than the 
demand and wages fall to their natural price. As this natural price only gives to 
the workers a minimum level of subsistence, the only way in which workers can 
improve their condition is by controlling their numbers thereby raising the price 
of labor. Poverty and unemployment are, therefore, only the result of the 
workers' natural propensity to reproduce beyond the available means of 
subsistence” (Gimenez, 1971). In the capitalist mode of production, workers do 
not escape their becoming superfluous, according to Marx. 
In capitalism, the worker and people who are dependent from him/her 
selling his/her labor force are dependent on some capitalist or the state having 
use for this labor capacity. The worker and his/her dependents face constantly 
an uncertain future; they do not know whether or not they will have enough to 
meet their subsistence requirements. Marx calls the worker a “virtual pauper:” 
“He can live as a worker only in so far as he exchanges his labour capacity for 
that part of capital which forms the labour fund. This exchange is tied to 
conditions which are accidental for him, and indifferent to his organic presence. 
He is thus a virtual pauper. Since it is further the condition of production based 
on capital that he produces ever more surplus labour, it follows that ever more 
necessary labour is set free. Thus the chances of his pauperism increase” 
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(Marx, 1973 p. 604). Marx claims that capitalists use workers' fear of pauperism 
to their advantage. 
Marx argues, therefore, that surplus populations are “necessary” for 
maintaining exploitation. The ways in which capitalists use the pool of 
necessary surplus workers – “the industrial reserve army” – are at least twofold: 
“the industrial reserve army, during the periods of stagnation and average 
prosperity, weighs down the active army of workers; during the period of over-
production and feverish activity, it puts a curb on their pretensions” (Marx, 1990 
p. 792). A small reserve army jeopardizes the capitalists' ability to maintain their 
rate of exploitation; for instance, in colonies where settlers may buy land easily, 
wage laborers are rare, and capitalists need to raise salaries and reduce their 
rate of profit in other to maintain production (Choudhury, 2009 p. 17). 
Based on what he observes in the 19th-century industrial capitalism, 
Marx distinguishes three kinds of industrial reserve army: the floating, the latent, 
and the stagnant. The former comprises workers who are displaced from 
employment to unemployment, and vice-versa, depending on fluctuations of the 
production system. Marx defines the latent reserve army as “part of the 
agricultural population [who] is constantly on the point of passing over into an 
urban or manufacturing proletariat” (Marx, 1990 p. 796). In the case of the 
United States, for instance, Mexican migrants are a “modern” form of latent 
reserve army, supplying excess labor force that American capitalists use to fill 
vacant job positions and to force down workers' salaries (Foley, 1986 p. 65). 
The last kind of industrial reserve army – the stagnant – gathers unskilled 
workers, who survive on the margins of the production system: from the 
perspective of the capitalists' interests, they remain “an inexhaustible reservoir 
of disposable labour-power” (Marx, 1990 p. 796). Marx adds to the three kinds 
of the industrial reserve army a fourth segment of the surplus population, that 
remains “unnecessary” to capitalists: the chronic paupers. 
The chronic paupers – the “unnecessary” surplus population from the 
perspective of the capitalists – consist of three groups apart from the 
lumpemproletariat, according to Marx. First, people who are able to work; 
second, orphans and pauper children; third, “the demoralized, the ragged, and 
those unable to work, chiefly people who succumb to their incapacity of 
adaptation, an incapacity which results from the division of labor; people who 
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have lived beyond a worker’s average life-span; and the victims of industry, 
whose number increases with the growth of dangerous machinery, of mines, 
chemical works, etc. the mutilated, the sickly, the widows, etc.” (Marx, 1990 p. 
797).  
Marx connects his account of surplus population to his economic 
understanding of exploitation, based on the labor theory of value, but such 
connection is not necessary. The idea of a surplus population that is impactful 
on dynamics of exploitation -- by “weighing down” active workers and “curbing” 
workers’ agendas -- is overall sociological: in the abstract, capitalists can 
threaten their employees by saying that if they do not work harder unemployed 
workers who are available in the labor market could potentially supplant them. 
Hence, capitalists might use any surplus population to their advantage. In 
Wrightian terms, the economically non-exploited oppressed matter to the 
dynamics of exploitation, to the extent that they can empower capitalists over 
workers in their search for their material interests. 
 
3. Conclusion 
I have summarized Wright's framework on oppression and exploitation. 
Such framework is mostly normative, and remains abstract, formal and logically 
driven. I have specially paid attention to the different levels of specificity in his 
work, given that according to him exploitation remains a specific type of 
economic oppression; he defines exploitation as exploitative economic 
oppression. 
Conceptually, I have shown that there is a potential interdependence 
between non-exploitative and exploitative economic oppression, especially clear 
in capitalism. I relied on Marx’s theory of surplus population to show such 
interdependence. My point does not pose a direct challenge to Wright’s 
framework, and should be seen as a contribution to his well-polished conceptual 
enterprise. 
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